Diesel oil bunkering: tank overflow through a taped vent, engine room fire (Stride)
EL-0134 · Solved · rating 0 · occurred 08 Jan 2024
Source: /cases/el-0134
What happened#
General cargo ship alongside at LaPorte, Texas, taking 80 mt of LSMGO into the port and starboard double-bottom DO tanks. The C/E and 3/E ran the bunkering from the ECR, with both fill valves open.
About 20 minutes after the start, a wiper saw diesel oil dripping from above. The starboard tank had overfilled; oil poured from an old vent-pipe cut-out onto the boiler, incinerator and ME. It ignited. The C/E and 3/E were found dead in the ECR; the wiper was seriously injured. The ship was a constructive total loss and was scrapped.
Diagnosis#
- Port tank took no oil at all. Its fill/suction valve, changed six weeks earlier, was a screw-down check angle valve (JIS F 7354,
100 mm), not the angle stop valve on the drawing. Same size and look, but oil could only flow out of the tank. - The only bunkering since the change went into the starboard tank, so nobody noticed.
- Starboard tank had room for about
37 mt. The barge delivered52 mtin about25 min. About14.8 mtwent up the vent. - Tanks shared one
12 invent. A7 × 11 inhole had been cut in it, about98 ftabove the tank top, and closed with the cut piece (welded nut/bolt, tabs), sealant and tape. No records. Oil pressure blew the piece off. - No high-level alarm on the ECR printout. Nobody was sounding the tanks locally.
- Both EEBDs were found unused. The ECR had no escape hatch of its own (not required).
Root cause#
The check valve blocked flow into the port tank. All the oil went into the starboard tank, which filled in about 25 min. Oil then went up the common vent and blew out the taped cut-out, instead of out of the gooseneck on the compass deck.
Behind this: the valve was ordered as a "store" by description, not checked against the drawing. Contributing: tank levels were not monitored as the SMS required, and bunkering was short-handed (procedure: 2 engineers + 2 ratings; actual: C/E, 3/E, fitter). Class later found vent cut-outs on three of seven sister ships.
Timeline / response#
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| 03:05 | Bunkering starts slowly. |
| 03:07–03:09 | C/E asks for more rate; barge pump to 1,400 rpm, 90 psi. Third request refused. |
| 03:25 | Wiper sees oil dripping; tells the ECR. |
| 03:28 | Unclear radio calls; barge stops pump. |
| 03:31 | Fire alarm. Emergency stops (fans, boiler, oil pumps); dampers ordered closed. |
| 03:34 | Coast Guard called. Skylight and dampers closed by hand; boundary cooling. |
| — | Engineers try to leave the ECR, meet flames, go back. |
| 03:38–03:50 | BA team beaten back by smoke (03:38, 03:45); at 03:50 one gets in via escape hatch, cannot find the crew. |
| 04:15 | Team enters: fire already out by itself (time unknown). Three crew found in the ECR. |
| 07:40 | CO2 release requested. Remote release fails. |
| 09:16 | CO2 fully released bottle by bottle. |
Lessons#
- Order valves from the system drawing. Check the type (stop, stop-check, non-return), not just size and look.
- Man the bunkering to procedure. Enough people to sound each tank often and report.
- Start bunkering slow and sound locally. Raise the rate only when each tank is rising. Agree with the barge how to stop if radio calls are unclear.
- Walk your fuel vent lines. Look for cut-outs, tape or patches, especially above hot surfaces.
- Test tank high-level alarms before bunkering. Here none was recorded, though the tank overflowed.
- Test the CO2 remote release and check the flexible hoses. Here the remote release failed and the hoses were bulging.
Source: NTSB report MIR-25-05 — Engine Room Fire aboard Cargo Vessel Stride.
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