Fatal engine room fire after opening a pressurised fuel filter (Moritz Schulte)
EL-0125 · Solved · rating 0 · occurred 04 Aug 2020
Source: /cases/el-0125
What happened#
LPG carrier discharging alongside in Antwerp. AE2 and AE3 were running and AE1 was on standby. After the morning toolbox talk the newly promoted 3/E asked the 2/E if he could clean the AE1 fuel filters. He was told AE1 had to stay on standby.
Working alone, he started to open the cover of the left-hand duplex filter while the system was still under pressure. With one nut off and the last one being undone, the 5.5 bar MGO pressure lifted the cover, split the O-ring, and sprayed fuel over him and onto the running AE2's turbocharger, about 1 m away. The fuel got through gaps in the exhaust insulation and ignited.
The crew closed the ER down quickly. The master held the CO₂ because the 3/E was missing. Two BA entries failed because of heat and smoke. A shore fire team found him after an hour using a thermal camera. He died 9 days later from smoke inhalation.
Diagnosis#
- The supply ball valve to AE1 was found closed, but only after the leak started. With it closed first, almost no fuel would have come out.
- The three-way cock between the two filters was half-way. That does not isolate either filter. Used properly, it lets you open one side while the engine runs.
- The job was not needed. The maker's instruction was to flush the filters in place by turning the handles, without opening them. The PMS still said "open and clean every 300 h", which was never updated after the ship changed to MGO only.
- In 59 records of this job there was not one risk assessment and no lock-out/tag-out for the fuel system. Nobody had questioned it.
Root cause#
A pressurised filter was opened without isolating it and without bleeding off the pressure, next to a running engine with gaps in its exhaust lagging. Behind that: a PMS job that didn't match the maker's instructions, no supervision of a junior engineer, and a training system that let him be promoted with only 2 of 65 required tasks signed off with evidence.
Timeline / response#
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| 08:00 | Toolbox talk. AE1 to stay on standby. |
| 09:00 | 3/E seen starting work on the AE1 filter cover. He refuses help twice. |
| 09:18 | ER fire alarm. Cargo discharge shut down. |
| 09:19 | Muster. 3/E missing. Fuel QCVs closed, fans stopped, flaps shut, emergency generator started. CO₂ held back. |
| 09:28 | First BA search team ready. Two entries turned back by heat and smoke. |
| ~10:20 | Shore fire team finds the 3/E with a thermal camera. |
Lessons#
Before you open any filter, strainer or pipe, prove it is dead: supply and return isolated, pressure released through the vent or drain, gauge at zero. If you can't isolate it without stopping the engine, ask before you start.
- Duplex filter: turn the change-over cock fully to the other side, then vent the side you are opening. Half-way isolates nothing.
- Flushing ≠ cleaning. Check what the maker's manual actually asks for, and make the PMS match it.
- A junior who declines help on a job with fuel under pressure is a reason to go and look, not to walk away.
- Check exhaust lagging with a thermal camera and close the gaps between pads.
- Practise escaping from the ER in smoke with EEBDs, using every escape route. Put EEBDs at the bottom of each ER stairway.
Source: MAIB report 4/2023 — Engine room fire on LPG carrier Moritz Schulte with loss of 1 life. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.
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