Standard bearing shell on an undersize journal: con-rods break out (Ocean Guardian)

Auxiliary EngineFire & SafetyCaterpillar 3516BNo alarm; loud bang, then smoke and fire in ER

Contents
  1. What happened
  2. Diagnosis
  3. Root cause
  4. Timeline / response
  5. Lessons
  6. Comments · 0

What happened#

Diesel-electric offshore supply vessel, four Caterpillar 3516B main DGs (1,990 kW each). All four were overhauled by shore technicians in early 2022. On sea trials, DG3 had run about 4 h since overhaul, at about 30 % load.

The ECR heard a loud bang and saw smoke. An engineer in the ER saw flames that "looked to engulf most of the engine". There were no abnormal alarms before the bang. The crew shut down, closed the ER and released CO2. No injuries.

Diagnosis#

  • Nos. 9 and 10 con-rods broke loose and blew off a crankcase door. The engine was damaged beyond repair and replaced with a spare.
  • The main journals had been ground 0.63 mm undersize (160.00 mm to 159.37 mm) before the 2020 sale, with undersize shells.
  • The crankpins were standard size, with standard shells.
  • At the overhaul, No. 6 main shell was removed and its part number not recorded. The technician who removed it ordered a standard-size replacement. A different technician, not involved before, later fitted it, with no report.
  • Nos. 9 and 10 big ends are fed by a cross-drilled passage from No. 6 main journal. The excess clearance cut their oil pressure by about 80 %.
  • The big-end cap bolts overheated, annealed and fractured.
Damaged con-rod seen through the ruptured crankcase (left) and DG3 after the fire (right). Photo: NTSB
Damaged con-rod seen through the ruptured crankcase (left) and DG3 after the fire (right). Photo: NTSB

Root cause#

A standard shell on a journal ground 0.63 mm undersize gave too much clearance at No. 6 main. The cross-drilled feed to Nos. 9 and 10 big ends lost oil pressure, the big ends overheated, and the loose rods broke the crankcase open. Hot oil and blow-by gas ignited.

The service company expected mains and crankpins to have been machined together, as was their own normal practice. With no maintenance records, the part number on the removed shell was the only accurate way to know the journal size without removing the crankshaft. It was not recorded, and the technician likely never checked it. No regrind record came with the ship when bought in March 2020.

Timeline / response#

TimeEvent
14:35Bang and fire at DG3. DG3 and DG4 stopped from ECR.
—ER fans stopped, dampers and fuel valves closed, ER evacuated.
—About 1 min later, DG1 and DG2 stopped. Blackout, emergency generator starts.
14:40All 28 CO2 bottles released into the ER.
14:45Shadowing tug alongside, bridle attached.
—Two crew in SCBA put out smouldering fires near DG3 with extinguishers and a bucket of water.
15:09Fire declared out.
16:24 / ~16:30Tow back begins. Crew re-enter in SCBA with an IR thermometer.
16:58Smouldering fire in the bilge under DG3, put out with AFFF.
17:52Alongside at the yard.

Lessons#

  1. Read and record the part number on every bearing shell you take out. It tells you if the journal is undersize. Order the replacement from that number.
  2. Don't assume mains and crankpins were ground together. Here only the mains were undersize.
  3. Keep the regrind history on the engine. Record journal sizes and shell part numbers, e.g. on a metal plate on the engine (the operator's post-casualty fix). Hand it over on sale.
  4. Document all contractor work. Ask for a service report with every bearing part number before you sign off.
  5. Check before you run, not while you run. DG3 gave no alarm. Check every fitted bearing against its recorded part number before the first start.
  6. After a crankcase blowout and CO2 release, expect re-ignition. Re-enter in BA with an IR thermometer and check the bilge under the plates.

Source: NTSB report MIR-23-08 — Diesel Generator Engine Failure on board Offshore Supply Vessel Ocean Guardian.

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